How, in the face of the Russian threat, to ensure and strengthen Ukraine's energy security at the heart of the country's social life

Ukraine: ensure and strenghten the energy security.pdf

Complete document from the work group

Energy Security for Ukraine

Having failed to win the swift military victory it had hoped for, Russia has been targeting civilian populations for over 2 years, in a bid to break their spirit of resistance - so far in vain. One of the main components of this deliberate strategy of terror targets energy infrastructures. As a result, the winter of 2022-2023 has been very difficult for Ukrainians, much more so than the following relatively mild one.

However, since the spring of 2024, Russia has stepped up its bombardment of civilians, particularly electrical installations, taking advantage of a growing shortage of Ukrainian air defenses. Power cuts have even reached the capital Kyiv, which this summer experienced blackouts lasting 12 to 15 hours a day. But every city in the country is affected to varying degrees. On August 26 alone, Russia launched 109 Iranian Shahed drones and 127 missiles. 35 of these missiles hit their targets, including the distribution substations of the three nuclear power plants still under Ukrainian control. At the time, they were responsible for around three-quarters of the country's remaining production, resulting in even more massive power cuts across the country. Russia has clearly announced its objective for the coming weeks: to prevent these crucial plants from operating. It is thus jeopardizing their cooling, increasing tenfold the nuclear threat posed to the whole of Europe for 2 years now by the occupation of the shutdown Zaporizhia power plant.

Russia seems to be waiting for the first bitter cold so as to strike massively at energy infrastructures at the worst possible moment, rendering Ukraine uninhabitable (buildings without water, heating, light or elevators, industries at a standstill), causing the evacuation of major cities and the departure abroad of millions of refugees. The preservation of fresh and frozen food, as well as vaccines, has already been compromised. In early September, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights denounced this strategy. Repeated attacks on hydroelectric dams, the other essential source of electricity still available (see map p.3), could not only further reduce production but also lead to ecological and human disasters in the very short term.

As we stated in a recent article in Le Monde, we can and must save Ukraine from this programmed nightmare, and the whole of Europe from a potential nuclear catastrophe.

The ten measures we are proposing are relatively inexpensive, if we compare them to the budget needed to rebuild the facilities targeted by the Russians, or even to the ruin that would result from radioactive contamination of the European continent, with all its consequences for the population.

THE 10 MEASURES WE PROPOSE

Preamble: power generation in Ukraine

Before the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukraine's energy sector had already been hit hard by the loss of mining resources in the Donbass (mainly coal and gas) and Crimea (offshore hydrocarbons). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), between 2013 and 2021, coal's share of electricity production will have fallen by more than half - which, by accelerating the necessary phase-out of fossil fuels (see proposition 9 below), obviously has not only negative aspects.

In 2021, again according to the IEA, total power generation in Ukraine will be 54.6% nuclear (the highest percentage in Europe after France), 32.2% thermal, 6.5% hydroelectric and 4.2% solar (see chart below).

Sources de production électrique en Ukraine

The 4 power plants in operation at the time had a total generating capacity of 13.8 GW. The largest, Zaporizhia (6 GW), has been shut down since it came under Russian control in spring 2022. The remaining reactors, Rivne, South-Ukraine and Khmelnytskyi (see map p.3 below), therefore represent only around 56% of pre-invasion nuclear generation capacity in 2022. 4 new 1 GW nuclear reactors are under construction at the Khmelnytskyi plant, but will not come on stream for at least 3 years.

After the last strikes in August 2024, Ukraine would only have 10-20% of its thermal power plant output and 55% of its hydroelectric power. According to an estimate by the specialist think-tank Dixigroup, even before August 26, Ukraine was short of around 4.5 GW of capacity to meet peak winter demand, estimated at 18 GW. The current shortfall is likely to be even greater.

Negotiations are underway to increase electricity imports from Hungary (which accounts for over 30% of electricity imports), Slovakia, Poland, Romania and Moldavia. However, the proposed increase from 1.7 GW to 2.4 GW would be a long way from satisfying all needs.

Another essential element for winter survival is heat production, managed by municipalities. In urban areas, around 60% of heating and hot water needs are met by above-ground steam networks (not underground, as in France). Targeted by the Russian bombing raids, these networks are less vulnerable due to their dense network. Some of these plants also use cogeneration (heat + electricity), which significantly improves energy efficiency and enables decentralized power generation.